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CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR DEATH CAUSED BY OPERATION
OF MOTOR VEHICLES IN WYOMING
Justice Parker, writing the opinion of the case of State v. Wilson,'
quoted the following words from Moreland's A Rationale of Criminal
Negligence:
...A carelessly drawn statute in Wyoming provides that an unintentional homicide in the commission of an unlawful act or2
by culpable negligence or criminal carelessness is manslaughter.
The law in question in State v. Wilson was Wyoming's involuntary manslaughter statute.a The case involved an automobile collision in which a
little girl was killed. The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed a conviction
of involuntary manslaughter and held that reversible error was committed
by the District Court of Goshen County in its denial of the defendant's
motion for a bill of particulars. The Supreme Court said that the defendant was misled as to the precise theory upon which the State would
prosecute the manslaughter charge because the State had not made it
clear whether the claim would be that the homicide resulted from defendant's alleged intoxication, negligence in driving on the wrong side of the
road, carelessness in coming on the highway, or some other improper
act. Justice Parker went on to say that there had been justifiable criticism
of the legislature, both in using alternative, similar terms to define involuntary manslaughter and also in enacting and retaining two other
4
statutes, each referring to deaths caused by unlawful automobile operation,
with no correlation of these statutes and no directions to enforcement
officials concerning how and when the statutes are to be applied.
The opinion in State v. Wilson was written in 1956 and the statutes
then in operation were the Compiled Statutes of 1945. The situation
today, however, is much the same as it was then, in that the manslaughter
statute is the same;5 the negligent homicide statute which was then Sec.
60-413, Vr.C.S. 1945, is almost identical; 6 however, what was Sec. 60-138,
W.C.S. 1945, respecting the penalty for causing injury or death to a
1.
2.
3.
4.

76 Wyo. 297, 301 P.2d 1056 (1956).
Id. at 1065.
Wyo. C.S. § 9-205 (1945).
Wyo. C.S. 3§ 60-138 and 60-413 (1945). Section 60-138 reads as follows: The violation
of any of the provisions of this article, except where otherwise provided, by any
person, shall be deemed a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not exceeding six (6)
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and, if any person operating a
motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of this article shall, by reason thereof,
seriously maim, injure or disfigure or cause the death of any person or persons,
such person shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than fourteen
(14) years.
5. Wyo. Stat. § 6-58 (1957).
6. Wyo Stat. § 31-232 (1957). Section 31-232 differs from § 60-413 only in that the
legislature has provided in § 31-232 that the director shall revoke the operating
privilege of any non-resident convicted of negligent homicide, which provision was
not included in § 60-413.
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person because of operating a motor vehicle in violation of the provisions
of the Motor Vehicle Code, has been changed by dropping therefrom any
reference to death or injury caused by motor vehicle operation. The
provisions for punishment when death ensues were apparently deleted
because they were considered unnecessary in view of the manslaughter
and negligent homicide statutes. Injuries from negligent motor vehicle
operation ,as distinguished from death therefrom, no longer constituted
separate crime, and would be covered by battery statutes.
The statutory situation concerning automobile homicide, then, is
much the same now as it was when State v. Wilson was decided. It will
be the purpose of this article to investigate this area of Wyoming law on
deaths from motor vehicle operation in an attempt to determine whether
the attending confusion is as serious as it seems to be at first blush.
The article will deal largely with involuntary manslaughter and negligent
homicide; the range of application and extent of overlapping, if any, of
the respective statutes; some problems of proof and procedure; and the
sanctions and penalties applicable and available under each statute. Because of the paucity of reported Wyoming cases there is a very meager
amount of explicit construction and interpretation of the various provisions
and words of the statutes. Therefore it will sometimes be necessary to
imply these constructions and meanings from various statements made in
the cases. For example, to date, no decision has been reported in which
a person has been charged with negligent homicide. The decisions that
have been reported indicate that Wyoming prosecutors have instead proceeded under the manslaughter statute in automobile death cases. The
article will show that where manslaughter is available, so would a charge
of negligent homicide be when the death is the result of motor vehicle
operation, although the converse is not necessarily true.
The provisions for involuntary manslaughter, within the general
manslaughter statute, read as follows:
Whoever unlawfully kills any human being
but in the commission of some unlawful act,
neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty of
shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not
years. 7 (Emphasis supplied)

. . . involuntarily,
or by any culpable
manslaughter, and
more than twenty

A Wyoming statute provides that where homicide is charged, it shall
be sufficient in the indictment to charge that the defendant did unlawfully kill the deceased, without the necessity of setting forth the manner
or means by which the death was caused. 8 This statute has been held
constitutional and not in violation of the provisions guaranteeing due
process. 9 Justice Parker has pointed out, however, that while such word7. Supra note 4.

8. Wyo. Stat. § 7-134 (1957).
9. State v. Dobbs, 70 Wyo. 26, 244 P.2d 280 (1952); State v. Wilson, 76 Wyo. 297, 301
P.2d 1056 (1956).
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ing is sufficient in the first instance, the statutory provisions should not
be considered to be restrictive so as to preclude the providing of specific
information in the interest of justice after the initial filing and during the
trial.' 0 And, of course, in order to obtain a conviction it must be shown
that the defendant killed the deceased either through the commission of
an unlawful act or by culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, within the
meaning of the statute.
It is plain that in Wyoming ordinary negligence on the part of the
defendant is not sufficient to convict him on a charge of involuntary manslaughter, but the negligence must be culpable." Wyoming has also held
that the terms "culpable'neglect" and "criminal carelessness" are synonymous. 12 The meaning of the words "culpable" and "criminal" is closely
akin to that of "willful" or "wanton" and involves circumstances where
the offender is aware or should be aware of the probable consequences of
his acts. 3 In State v. McComb, justice Blume made the following statement:

...carelessness by reason of driving at a speed that is unreasonable or is such as is likely to endanger life or limb is not necessarily
criminal carelessness within the meaning of our staute providing
for punishment for manslaughter. 14 (Emphasis supplied)
So, it is not enough that life or limb is likely to be endangered, but accompanying this likelihood must be the fact that the actor is aware of
such likelihood, or circumstances must be present under which he would
be charged with such an awareness.
The majority of Wyoming cases involving manslaughter by automobile are instances in which the prosecution sought to convict the defendant by proceeding under the "unlawful act" portion of the statute.1 5
One might wonder whether there is any difference between manslaughter
by unlawful act and manslaughter through culpable neglect or criminal
carelessness, and if there is, what determines which route the prosecutor
will take? The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that when the unlawful act complained of consists of negligence, it must be more than ordinary
negligence and must be culpable or criminal in its nature.' 6 But what of
the case where negligence is not a factor, or if it is, is not culpable or
criminal? Those manslaughter-by-automobile cases in Wyoming which
have resulted in convictions all appear to have involved the unlawful act
of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

Drunken driving

has been made a misdemeanor in Wyoming17 and the commission of such
10. State v. Wilson, 76 Wyo. 297, 301 P.2d 1056, 1064 (1956).
11. State v. McComb, 33 Wyo. 346, 239 Pac 526 (1925).
12. State v. Catellier, 63 Wyo. 123, 179 P.2d 203 (1947).
13. Supra note 11.

14. Id. at 529.
15. In addition to the cases already cited see State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d
539 (1947); Goich v. State, 80 Wyo. 179, 339 P.2d 119 (1959).
16. Supra note 11.

17. Wyo. Stat. § 31-129 (1957).
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an unlawful act is malum in se.18 Misdemeanors malum in se have
been defined as, "misdemeanors naturally dangerous to life or misdemeanors made such because of a desire of the legislature to avoid the
It
particular kind of death involved in the case under consideration.""
has been said that driving while intoxicated is an act of such an unlawful
and culpably negligent character that the mere fact of so driving takes the
place of a criminal intent, and if death results the driver is guilty of at
least manslaughter.2 0 From the definition of misdemeanors "malum in se"
given above and those cited in footnote 18, it would appear that not only
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, but the commission of all acts malum in se, resulting in death, would also constitute
at least manslaughter, without proof of negligence. Lending support to
the premise that negligence is not an element requiring separate proof
when the defendant has been charged with an act malum in se, is the
fact that in Wyoming automobile manslaughter cases, which as stated
before have almost exclusively dealt with drunken driving, negligence has
not appeared as a separate issue.2 1
Whether the state proceeds according to manslaughter by unlawful
act or by culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, it must prove in any
case that the homicide was a proximate result of the violation.2 2 In
Goich v. State2 3 an instruction was held to be erroneous which led the
jury to believe that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter if guilty
either of drunkeness or driving on the wrong side of the highway, as both
in that case were needed in order to establish the chain of causation. The
court said that "the jury in a criminal case must be instructed as to all of
the unlawful acts which are requisite to a conviction on any charge, and
the failure to so state must be assumed to have been prejudicial to a
4
defendant who is convicted."2
To summarize manslaughter by automobile in Wyoming: it may be
accomplished through culpable neglect or criminal carelessness; it may be
accomplished by an unlawful act, malum, in se, not a felony. If the
unlawful act is a misdemeanor based on negligence, the negligence must
be culpable or criminal.
Further proof that this is what the legislature intended is supplied by
a reference to the involuntary manslaughter statute of the State of Indiana,
the state of origin of Wyoming's statute.2 5 The Indiana Statute is identical
to that of Wyoming, except that it does not contain provisions involving
18. 3 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure § 974 (1957). See also 44 Iowa L. Rev.
558 (1959).
19. 18 Md. L. Rev. 145, 149 (1958).
20. 3 Wharton, op. cit. supra note 18.
21. See State v. Cantrell, supra note 15; State v. Dobbs, supra note 9; Goich v. State,
supra note 15.
22. Thompson v. State, 41 Wyo. 72, 283 Pac. 151 (1929).
23. Supra note 15.
24. Id. at 122.
25. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-3405 (Burns 1956).
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than an act prohibited by positive statute is demanded. The Indiana court
negligence. Indiana decisions under this statute make it clear that more
has held that unlawful acts may include willful, wanton and reckless acts,
implying an indifference to consequences equivalent to criminal intent. 26
Involuntary manslaughter is of course a felony27 and is punishable by
imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period not to exceed twenty years.2Negligent homicide by motor vehicle, on the other hand, is not a
felony, but a misdemeanor. 2" Though Wyoming has had a negligent homicide statute since 1939, the reported cases give no evidence of anyone having
as yet been convicted of this crime. The statute provides:
When the death of any person ensues within 1 year as a proximate
result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle in reckless
disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating such
vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide.8 0
Any attempt to ascertain the intended scope of this statute and whether
and to what extent it has any effect on Wyoming's involuntary manslaughter staute entails a degree of speculation. In State v. Cantrell it
was contended that the negligent homicide statute impliedly repealed the
involuntary manslaughter statute in regard to automobile homicide cases.
In rejecting the contention, Chief Justice Riner first mentioned that the
negligent homicide statute failed to deal with involuntary manslaughter
in the commission of some unlawful act. He continued:
Whether ... the negligent Homicide Act repeals the provisions of
the manslaughter statute immediately following the disjunctive
"or" . . . or whether both statutes shall be deemed operative as
dealing with separate matters and so both should stand intact
3
we do not find it necessary at this time to decide. '
Nor has the Wyoming Supreme Court found it necessary to decide that
question since. Chief Justice Riner did state that repeals by implication
are not favored.' 2 Also Sec. 31-232 is almost identical to the provisions of
the Uniform Vehicle Code pertaining to negligent homicide33 and the
courts are split on whether the passage of this act effects an implied repeal
of manslaughter statutes as they apply to automobile homicide.
What was the intent of the Wyoming legislature when it passed the
Negligent Homicide Act? The generally understood purpose for the
passage of such acts is that as compared with manslaughter it will tend
26. Dunville v. State, 188 Ind. 373, 123 N. E. 689 (1919); Minardo v. State, 204 Ind.
422, 183 N.E. 548 (1932).

27. For the statutory provisions regarding penalties for felonies and misdemeanors see
Wyo. Stat. §§ 6-6 and 6-7 respectively (1957).
28. Supra note 5.
29. Compare Wyo. Stat. § 31-232 and 6-6 (1957), the latter providing that the minimum
term of imprisonment in the penitentiary shall be one year.
30. Supra note 6.
31. State v. Cantrell, supra note 15 at 543-544.
32. Id. at 542.
33. Uniform Vehicle Code 1 11-903 (rev. 1956).
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to make juries more receptive to returning convictions in automobile
death cases. The feeling has been that juries are reluctant to find offenders guilty of involuntary manslaughter because of the severe punishment
meted out.
A number of alternative possibilities present themselves in Wyoming.
First, it is possible that the negligent homicide statute was intended to
repeal the involuntary manslaughter provisions in automobile cases,
except the unlawful act provision. But the cases evince no reason why
one part of the manslaughter statute should be repealed and the other
left alone. It has never been held that culpable neglect or criminal carelessness partake of a lesser degree of criminal responsibility than that
associated with the unlawful act portion of the statute.
A second possibility is that the Wyoming legislature intended that the
element of willfulness or wantoness need not be present in order to find
someone guilty of a "reckless disregard for the safety of others." If such
was the construction intended, the state would be able to get a conviction
in an automobile homicide case when the circumstances and evidence might
not justify an involuntary manslaughter charge. Thus, where a prosecutor
could prove culpable neglect or criminal carelessness ,he could also prove
reckless disregard, but not vice-versa, if we assume that a reckless disregard
is not as severe as culpable neglect or criminal carelessness. This view
would account for the reduction in the grade of the crime as compared
with -involuntary manslaughter.
One substantial obstacle to the theory just mentioned is that "reckless
disregard for the safety of others" has often been defined in terms of willfulness or wantonness.3 4 Too, a Wyoming court, in citing with approval
various decisions from other states, appears to equate reckless disregard
with wantonness and leaves one with the impression that "reckless disregard" is to mean the same thing as does "culpable neglect or criminal
carelessness.".1
Assuming that "reckless disregard for the safety of others" does mean
the same as "culpable neglect or criminal carelessness" a third possibility
is introduced. Perhaps the legislature simply intended that the prosecutor
have a choice between negligent homicide and involuntary manslaughter,
a choice between equals in all respects except as concerns the punishment
inflicted. (This was virtually the effect of State v. Cantrello.)3 Such a
construction would be in accord with the stated purpose for enacting negligent homicide legislation. If for any reason the state should fear that a
manslaughter charge might not stand up, though the evidence seemed sufficient, it could then turn to a charge of negligent homicide, to which the
34. As indicated by the many decisions assembled in "Reckless Disregard of Safety of
Others" 36 Words and Phrases 805.
'5. State v. McComb, supra note 11 at 528-529.
36. State v. Cantrell. stipra note 15.
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jury theoretically should be more receptive. Indeed, it is entirely possible
that in particular circumstances negligent homicide could be considered
arn "included offense" to a charge of involuntary manslaughter.
In conclusion the writer repeats words of justice Parker, written in
1956 in answer to the argument of unconstitutionality directed against the
automobile death statutes of Wyoming:
Neither these criticisms nor the views expressed in defendant's
brief convince us of the unconstitutionality of the statutes, but we
are of the definite opinion that for the best administration of such
negligent7 homicide law a modernization of the statutes is indicated.1
A proper modernization of the statutes could perhaps be accomplished
simply by deleting the "culpable neglect or criminal carelessness' part of
the involuntary manslaughter statute and retaining the remainder of
that statute and the whole of the negligent homicide statute. With the
deletion of that language would go any reason for construing "unlawful
act" in terms of negligence, which is, at best, confusing. This does not
necessarily mean that the scope of the involuntary manslaughter statute
would be reduced since, by following the lead of the Indiana court, the
Wyoming court could construe the statute to include any willful, wanton,
and reckless acts. Then, depending on his feelings as to the effect of the
circumstances of the case upon a jury, and of course on his sense of justice,
the prosecutor could then choose whether to proceed under the manslaughter statute or the negligent homicide statute.
KEIT-I LEWALLEN
37. State v. Wilson, supra note 10 at 1065.

